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Abstract 
Accepting a proposition means that our confidence 
in this proposition is strictly greater than the 
confidence in its negation. This paper investigates 
the subclass of uncertainty measures, expressing 
confidence, that capture the idea of acceptance, what 
we call acceptance functions. Due to the 
monotonicity property of confidence measures, the 
acceptance of a proposition entails the acceptance 
of any of its logical consequences. In agreement 
with the idea that a belief set (in the sense of 
Giirdenfors) must be closed under logical 
consequence, it is also required that the separate 
acceptance of two propositions entail the 
acceptance of their conjunction. Necessity (and 
possibility) measures agree with this view of 
acceptance while probability and belief functions 
generally do not. General properties of acceptance 
functions are established. The motivation behind 
this work is the investigation of a setting for belief 
revision more general than the one proposed by 
Alchourr6n, Giirdenfors and Makinson, in 
connection with the notion of conditioning. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Giirdenfors (1988, 1992) views a belief state as modelled 
by a so-called belief set made of logical sentences. The key 
property of a belief set is its closure under logical 
consequences. Namely if a belief set � logically entails a 
formula lj>, <!>also belongs to �. Alchourr6n, Giirdenfors 
and Makinson (1985) have proposed rationality postulates 
(the so-called AGM postulates) for belief revision. 
Giirdenfors and Makinson (1988) have then established that 
revision operations obeying these postulates are based on 
an epistemic entrenchment ordering. Such an ordering has 
been shown to be equivalent to a comparative necessity 
relation (Dubois and Prade, 1991) whose unique numerical 
counterparts are set functions called necessity measures 
(Dubois, 1986). Thus, a set function modelling 
(un)certainty is at work in the belief revision operations 
obeying the AGM postulates. 
A natural question then arises: can we imagine other 
revision mechanisms underlied by other types of set 
functions? A preliminary investigation of this problem is 
addressed in this paper in the following way. A belief state 
will be directly described by means of a set function, 
expressing confidence, which is assumed to be monotonic 
with respect to set inclusion, as usual for any set function 
candidate for modelling uncertainty. A belief base is then 
made of propositions lj> (here viewed as sets of models) 
which are accepted in the sense that the confidence in <1> is 
strictly greater than the confidence in "not lj>". In the paper 
we shall assume that this belief base is a belief set, that 
is, closed under logical consequences. Namely, if lj> entails 
'JI and <1> is accepted, 'JI should be accepted (a condition 
satisfied by any confidence function due to their 
monotonicity), and moreover, if lj> is accepted and 'JI is 
accepted, then the conjunction lj> 1\ 'JI should be accepted 
(closure under conjunction). The latter induces constraints 
on the set functions which can be used for defining a belief 
set in this way. Confidence measures producing a belief 
base that is closed under conjunction are called acceptance 
functions. Section 2 formally introduces the proposed 
view of belief sets in terms of confidence measures. 
Section 3 investigates the characteristic properties of 
acceptance functions. Section 4 provides various examples 
of acceptance functions (including necessity measures) and 
characterizes the probability measures as well as the belief 
functions in the sense of Shafer, that are acceptance 
functions. Section 5 defines conditioning for acceptance 
functions and briefly discusses its use for belief revision in 
this setting. 
2 ACCEPTED BELIEFS 
Let Q be a finite set of states representing possible 
situations. A subset of n can be understood as the set of 
models of a proposition, also called an event. Capital 
letters A, B, C, . . .  will both denote propositions and their 
corresponding sets of models. A [0,1]-valued confidence 
measure g on 2n, also called a "fuzzy" measure (Sugeno, 
1977), is a monotonic, [0,1]-valued, set function such that 
i) g(0) = 0 ii) g(Q) = 1; 
iii) if A �:;;;; B �:;;;; Q, then g(A) � g(B). 
i) and ii) mean respectively that no confidence can be put 
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on the contradiction, and that the tautology should receive 
the maximum amount of confidence, while iii) expresses 
the compatibility of the confidence measure with the 
logical entailment: if A entails B, the confidence in B 
cannot be less than the confidence in A. Besides, the use 
of the scale [0, 11 is not compulsory for defining 
confidence measures. A linear ordering is sufficient. 
However the use of the scale [0, 11 is natural if we want to 
include classical uncertainty set functions such as 
probability measures or belief functions. 
In the literature, set functions representing uncertainty, 
here called confidence measures, are always supposed to be 
monotonic with respect to set inclusion. Thus confidence 
measures encompass probability measures, belief and 
plausibility functions, possibility and necessity measures 
among other well-known uncertainty functions. 
Acceptance is understood as taking a proposition for 
granted, as being more likely than its negation. Formally 
it is then defined by 
A is accepted iff g(A) > g(A) 
where A denotes the complement/negation of A. This 
concept of acceptance is in accordance with the view that it 
is not really a matter of degree, as advocated by Cohen 
(1993), because accepting A comes down to a mental 
decision, namely "to adopt the policy of taking the 
proposition that A as a premiss in certain circumstances". 
A belief base is then made of all the accepted propositions 
in a given context. Namely let 8t.C(g) = {A, g(A) > g(A)} 
be the belief base induced by g. Propositions out of the 
belief base are either such that the opposite proposition is 
in the belief base or such that an equal confidence is given 
to the proposition and its opposite. In the latter. case, it 
expresses a state of ignorance with respect to the 
proposition. The assumed closure of the belief base leads 
to postulate that 
1) if A is accepted and A implies B then B is accepted; 
2) if A is accepted and B is accepted, then A r1 B is 
accepted. 
When these postulates hold, 8t.C(g) is a belief set in the 
sense of Gardenfors. These two conditions write 
i) if g(A) > g(A) and A \; B then g(B) > g(B), 
this is satisfied by any confidence measure since 
g(B) � g(A) > g(A) � g(B). 
Indeed A implies B is expressed by A (; B or equivalently 
to A� B. 
ii) g(A) > g(�)} � g(A r1 B)> g(A u B). 
g(B) > g(B) 
(closure under conjunction) 
This second requirement is not innocuous at all, but has 
important consequences on the type of confidence 
measures which can be used as it is shown in the next 
section. Confidence measures satisfying the two 
requirements are called acceptance functions in the 
following. Note that requirement ii) forbids to have A 
accepted and B accepted with A r1 B = 0 since g(0) = 0 
should hold for confidence measures, which leads to the 
violation of ii). Thus the set of accepted propositions {A, 
g(A) > g( A)} is deductively closed and consistent when g 
is an acceptance function. 
3 GENERAL PROPERTIES OF 
ACCEPTANCE FUNCTIONS 
Acceptance functions are characterized by the existence of a 
kernel subset K defined by the intersection of all the 
accepted subsets, such that any accepted subset/proposition 
A can be determined by checking that A � K. This 
characterization is made precise by the different 
propositions established in this section. 
Proposition 1: Let g be an acceptance function. Then 
3! K \; 0, K � 0, such that g(K) > g(R) 
and i) 'i A � K, A is accepted; 
ii) 'i A \; K, A is accepted; 
iii) 'i A such that A� K and A� K, g(A) = g(A). 
Proof: 
Let g be an acceptance function. 
Let K = n {Ai I g(Aj) > g( Ai) }. 
Note that if Ai is accepted and Aj is accepted, then 
Ai r1 Aj is accepted; moreover if Ak is also accepted, 
then (Ai r1 Aj) r1 Ak is accepted and so on. Thus 
n { Ai I g(Ai) > g( Ai)} is accepted and denoted K. As 
such, it cannot be empty (since (g(0) = 0 for 
confidence measures). Then K � 0 and g(K) > g(K). 
Due to the monotonicity of g we have 
g(A);;::: g(K) and g(K) � g(A), 'i A, A� K (<=>A(; K) 
and 
g(A) ;;::: g(K) > g( K) ;;::: g(A), 'i A, A (; K ( <=> A� K). 
Assume A� K and A� K, or equivalently A r1 K 
:t:. 0 and A r1 K :t:. 0. 
Then if A is accepted, A r1 K should be accepted 
since K is accepted. This contradicts the fact that K is 
the smallest accepted subset. Thus g(A) � g(A). But 
if A is accepted, A r1 K should be accepted which 
again leads to a contradiction. Thus g(A) � g(A) and 
finally g(A) = g(A). • 
Figure 1 visualizes the contents of the above proposition. 
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is that 
A is accepted if and only if A � K 
(since A\; R � A� K in case ii)). 
A is accepted A is accepted 
ttJOOJ� 
g(A) = g(A) g(A) = g(A) g(A) = g(A) 
Figure 1 
Moreover it can be shown that all the subsets A such that 
neither A nor A lies in eSI'tC(g), have the same level of 
confidence. In other words, the following proposition 
holds. 
Proposition 2: Let g be an acceptance function. 3k e 
[0,1], 'VA such that A� K and A� K, g(A) = g(A) = k. 
Moreover g(K) ::;; k and k ::;; g(K) holds. 
Proof: 
Assume that 
3A, An K -::t- 0, An K -::t- 0, g(A) = g(A) = k 
3B, BnK-::t-0, BnK-::t-0, g(B)=g(B)=k' 
with k > k'. 
Clearly, (A u B) n K "1:- 0. Let us show that g(A u 
B) -::t- g(A n B). Indeed 
g(A u B);::: g(A) = k > k' = g(B);::: g(A n B). 
Then we have (Au B) n K = 0 or equivalently, 
(Au B)� K. 
We can prove in the same way that 
(Au B)� K 
(Au B)� K 
(Au B)� K 
since A and A, B and B play the same role. Then 
K!;;; (Au B) n (Au B) n (Au B) n (Au B)= 
[(An A)uB] n [(An A)uB] =0. 
This is impossible and leads to the rejection of the 
hypothesis k > k'. Similarly, k' > k should be also 
rejected. Hence g(A) = g(B) = k = k'. When A* 0, 
A !;;; K and A "1:- K, note that A verifies the 
assumptions at the beginning of the proof, i.e., A n 
K * 0, A n K "1:- 0. Thus g(A) = g( A) = k since 
A e eSI'tC(g) and A e e9't C(g). On the whole, 3k, 
"''A e eSI'tC(g), A e e9't C(g), g(A) = k. Choosing 
A !;;; K, then if A -::t-0 
g(A) = k ::;; g(K). 
Similarly for A � K, A -::t- 0, we have 
g(K) ::;; g(A) = k. • 
Thus we have shown that for any acceptance function g 
there exists a kernel subset K !;;; n, and a number k e 
[0, 1] such that g(K) > g(K), k e [g(K),g(K)], and g 
verifies 
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( g(Q) = 1 
if K !;;; A then g(A) ;::: g(K) 
if K!;;; A then g(K) ;::: g(A) 
if K � A and K � A then g(A) = k e [g(K),g(K)] 
g(0) = 0. 
(1) 
k will be called the indifference level of g. Conversely, we 
have 
Proposition 3: Any confidence measure satisfying (1) 
is an acceptance function. 
Proof: 
Let A be such that g(A) > g( A). Then K !;;; A. Let B 
be another accepted subset. Then K !;;; B and K !;;; 
An B with g(A n B);::: g(K) > g(K);::: g(A u :8). • 
Thus the propositions such that A or its negation is 
entailed by K can be ordered according to the values of 
g(A) or g(A), while the propositions such that neither 
themselves nor their opposites are accepted, are all put by 
g at the same level k, expressing mere ignorance about 
them. In particular, we find that any acceptance function g 
is also a partial ignorance function in the sense of Dubois, 
Prade and Smets ( 1995) that maps all unknown 
propositions to some level k between 0 and 1. 
Acceptance is preserved by duality as shown by the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4: Let h be the set function associated 
with g by duality. Namely 'VA, h(A) = 1 - g(A). Then h 
is an acceptance function if and only if g is an acceptance 
function, and h and g have the same kernel subset and the 
sum of the indifference levels of h and g equals 1. 
Proof: 
Let g be an acceptance function with kernel subset K 
and indifference level k. Then from Propositions 1 
and 2, we have h(Q) = 1, h(0) = 0; when K!;;; A, we 
have g(A) ;::: g(K) > g( K) ;::: g( A) � h(A) ;::: h(K) > 
h(K) ;::: h( A) and when K � A and K � A, g(A) = 
g(A) = k � h(A) = h(A) = 1 - k. Thus applying 
Proposition 3, if g is an acceptance function then h 
is an acceptance function (with the same kernel 
subset K and indifference level 1 -k). The converse 
obviously holds since \;/A, g(A) = 1 - h( A). • 
4 SET FUNCTIONS DEFINING A 
BELIEF SET 
4. 1 EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTANCE 
FUNCTIONS 
Let us consider a belief function in the sense of Shafer 
(1976) defined by Bel(A) = L0:tC�A m(C) where m is a 
basic probability assignment such that I.e m(C) = 1; C is 
called a focal subset iff m(C) > 0. Belief functions are 
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monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion. Note that the expression 
of acceptance for A in terms of belief functions, namely 
Bel(A) > Bel(A.) is equivalent to its expression in terms of 
plausibility measures Pl(A) = 1 - Bel(A.), since the 
equivalence Bel(A) > Bel(A.) <=> Pl(A) > Pl(A.) obviously 
holds. 
The closure under conjunction writes 
Let us consider a belief function whose focal subsets are 
structured in the following way: 3K, m(K) > 0, and 'VC if 
m(C) > 0 then K � C. K is called a core subset and the 
intersection of all the focal subsets contains the core focal 
subset. Then we have the following result. 
Proposition 5: A belief function with a core subset is 
an acceptance measure. 
Proof: 
Indeed K � A and K � B are necessary conditions to 
have Bel(A) > 0 and Bel(B) > 0. Then K � A 11 B 
and Bel(A 11 B) > 0. Since 'VC such that m(C) > 0, 
C :;;;1 K, we have A II C ::;: 0, B II C ::;: 0, A II B II 
C::;: 0, then Bel(A.) = Bel(B) =Bel( Au B)= 0 and 
(2) holds trivially. • 
Clearly A is accepted if and only if A :;;;1 K and for the 
propositions A which are accepted we have Bel(A) � 
Bel(K) > Bel(K) = 0. Moreover, k, as defined by 
Proposition 2, is equal to 0, i.e., k = Bel( K) = 0. In terms 
of plausibility measures, we have Pl(A) = Pl(K) = 1 > 
Pl(K) = 1 - Bel(K) > 0 if and only if A is accepted and k = 
Pl(K) = 1. 
Let us consider necessity and possibility measures, denoted 
by N and IT respectively (Zadeh, 1978, Dubois and 
Prade, 1988). They are defined from a ranking of the 
elements of Q according to a possibility distribution 1t: 
Q � [0,1], such that maxro 7t(ro) = 1 and 7t(ro) � 7t(ro') 
means that ro is at least as plausible as ro '. The set 
functions are then defined as IT(A) = maxO>E A 7t( ro) and 
N(A) = minroe: A 1 -7t(ro). 
Corollary: Necessity measures (as well as possibility 
measures) are acceptance measures. 
Proof: 
Indeed necessity measures (e.g., Dubois and Prade, 
1988) are consonant belief functions whose focal 
subsets are nested, and the smallest focal subset is 
the kernel. This is not surprizing since we have both 
N(A) > 0 � N(A.) = 0 and N(A 11 B) = min(N(A), 
N(B)), while possibility measures (Zadeh, 1978) are 
associated with necessity measures by the duality 
I1(A) = 1 - N(A. ), and then I1(A) > IT(A.) <=> N(A) � 
N(A.) holds under the form IT(A) = 1 > IT( A) <=> 
N(A) > 0 = N(A). • 
Let us point out that an acceptance measure does not 
necessarily satisfy the entailment g(A) > 0 and g(B) > 
0 � g(A 11 B) > 0, which might look as a weak version 
of acceptance. Possibility measures provide a 
counterexample since we may have IT(A) > 0, IT(B) > 0 
and ITCA 11 B)= 0 for IT(A) = SUProeA 7t(ro), with 1t > 0 
on A 11 B and A 11 B while 1t = 0 on A 11 B. Besides, 
note that necessity measures do not only satisfy the 
closure under conjunction under the form 
{
N(A) > N(�) = O � N(A 11 B)> N(A u B)= 0 N(B) > N(B) = 0 
but also fulfil the property 
{N(A) = 1 
N(B) = 1 � N(A 11 B)= 1. 
More generally, let us consider an acceptance function 
such that g(A) = 1 and g(B) = 1 entails g(A 11 B)= 1 for 
all A and B. This means that cS"'t.C(g) contains {A, g(A) = 
1 }, which is a sub-belief set of cS"'t.C(g). Indeed, it cannot 
be that g(A) = g(A) = 1 (which would imply g(0) = 1). 
Then 3K* such that g(A) = 1 if and only if A :;;;1 K* with 
K* = n {A I g(A) = 1 }. Clearly K* :;;;1 K = n {A I g(A) > 
g(A) } = n {A I N(A) > 0} when g = N. Since N(A) = 
infroe: A (1-1t(ro)), K* = {ro E Q, 7t(ro) > 0} and K = 
{ro E Q, 7t(ro) = 1}. 
Besides, there exist belief functions without a core subset, 
which are acceptance measures. 
Proposition 6: A belief function with a focal subset 
which is a singleton and has a weight strictly greater than 
one half, is an acceptance measure. 
Proof: 
Let { ro0} be the (necessarily unique) focal singleton 
of a belief function Bel such that m( { ro0}) > 112. If 
A is accepted Bel(A) > Bel(A) which entails that 
ro0 E A. Indeed assume ro0 e: A, then ro0 E A and 
Bel(A) > 112, then Bel(A) < 112 since Bel(A) + 
Bel( A) < 1; this leads to a contradiction. Thus if A is 
accepted and B is accepted, <0o belongs to both A and 
B and thus belongs to A 11 B. Then A 11 B is 
accepted, since Bel(A 11 B)> 112 > Bel( Au B). • 
The state ro0 is understood as the "normal" one in the 
sense that this state is more believed to be the true one 
than any other statement that excludes it. Note that apart 
from this focal subset { ro0}, there is no constraints on the 
other focal subset(s) (which exist if m( {roo}) < 1), except 
that the sum of their weights is 1 - m( {roo}) S 112. 
Observe that with a belief function whose focal subsets 
have a non-empty intersection, but without a core subset, 
we may have Bel(A) > Bel(t...), Bel(B) > Bel(B) while 
Bel(A n B) = 0, since the intersection A n B may no 
longer contain a focal subset. Indeed consider, for instance, 
a belief function whose all focal subsets Fi have a non-
empty intersection, i.e., n i Fi -:f. 0, but the intersection is 
not a focal subset. Then Bel(Fj) > 0 = Bel( F j). V i .  
Assume moreover that the belief function is such that 
3 i,j , Fi n Fj contains no focal subset, then 
Bel(Fi n Fj) = 0. Thus there exist belief functions which 
are not acceptance functions. In fact, a more interesting 
question is to investigate if there are many belief functions 
that can act as acceptance functions. This is the topic of 
the following subsection, which fully solves the problem. 
4. 2 BELIEF FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE 
ACCEPTANCE FUNCTIONS 
The following proposition characterizes the ones and only 
belief functions which are acceptance functions. 
Proposition 7: A belief function Bel (with basic 
probability assignment m) is an acceptance function based 
on a kernel K = n {A, Bel(A) > Bel(A.)} if and only if: 
i) either there exists a singleton K such that m(K) > 
Bel(K); (then K is the kernel and IKI = 1). 
ii) or any focal subset F of Bel is such that F;;;;? K where 
K is a focal subset such that IKI � 2 
iii) or the only focal subsets are {roK}, {ro'K} with 
m( { roK}) = m( { ro'K} ), and possibly supersets of K = 
{roK,ro'K}. 
Proof: 
Assume IKI = 1. Then K = {ro0}. lf m(K) > Bel(K), 
and m( { ro0}) > 112, then Bel is an acceptance 
function (Proposition 6). More generally it holds that 
m( { ro0}) > Bel(.Q- { ro0}) = Lrooe: p m(F). It is easy 
to check thatc% C (Bel) is a belief set, since 
c%C(Bel) = {A, ro0 e A}. Indeed if ro0 e A, then 
Bel( A) �Bel( {roo}) > Bel(.Q- {roo}) � Bel( A); and if 
ro0 � A, then A e c%C(Bel), and this exhausts all 
possibilities. Hence Bel is an acceptance function. 
Conversely, if all the focal subsets F which are 
singletons are such that m(F) � Bel(F), then for any 
singleton K, 3 A ;;;;? K and A is not accepted (it is 
sufficient to take A = K). Then Bel is not an 
acceptance function based on a singleton. This solves 
case i). 
Assume that a belief function Bel is an acceptance 
function based on a kernel event K with IKI � 2, and 
such that 3F, m(F) > 0 and F � K. Then 3 roK e 
K n F and there holds Bel(F u { roK}) > Bel( { roK }). 
This leads to a contradiction if F u { roK} '# K as it is 
going to be shown. Indeed since Bel is supposed to 
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be an acceptance function, we should have VA such 
that A� K, A� K, VB such that B � K, B � I<., 
Bel(A) = Bel(B) from Proposition 2. But this does 
not hold for A = F u { roK} and B = { roK} although 
A� K if F u { roK} � K, A � K and B � K since 
roK E K, roK E A, roK E B, and B � K since B is a 
singleton and K has at least two elements. Consider 
now the case where F u {roK};;;;? K but F u {roK} '# 
K. Thus, 3 ro e F n K, and we have PI( { ro,roK}) > 
PI ( { ro K }) since m(F) > 0. But PI is also an 
acceptance function with kernel subset K from 
Proposition 4. Since { ro,roK} � K and { ro,ffiK} � K 
(since ro !2: K and IKI � 2), it should hold that 
PI( { ro,roK}) = PI( { roK}) from Proposition 2 again, 
which leads to a contradiction. Hence either VF, F � 
K implies m(F) = 0, and we are in case (ii), or F u 
{ roK} = K. Note that in case (ii) m(K) > 0 should 
hold; otherwise we would have Bel(K) = 0 which is 
impossible. 
Assume F u { roK} = K and IFI > 2. Then 3ro, ro' -:f. 
ro, roE F, ro' E F. Since {roK} � K, F � K, {ro} � 
K, we should have Bel(F) = Bel( { roK}) = Bel( { ro}) 
because Bel is supposed to be an acceptance function 
but Bel(F) > Bel( { ro} ). Thus F can have only one 
element ro p  and we should have m( { ro K }) = 
m( { ffip }). Clearly, for any subset A disjoint with K, 
one must have Bel(A u { roK}) = Bel( { roK}) which 
forbids focal subsets disjoint with or overlapping K 
without containing it.This is case (iii). 
Conversely when IKI � 2, Proposition 5 has 
established that a belief function all focal subsets of 
which contain a single focal subset is an acceptance 
function. It is easy to see that a belief function 
containing two singleton focal subsets of equal 
weight both contained in all other focal subsets is 
also an acceptance structure. • 
In summary, the belief functions which are acceptance 
functions either have a kernel which is a focal subset 
contained in all other focal subsets, or have a focal 
singleton K of sufficient weight, or have two focal subsets 
which are singletons with equal weights, both included in 
the other focal subsets (if any). 
4. 3 PROBABILITY MEASURES WHICH ARE 
ACCEPTANCE FUNCTIONS 
It is also interesting to characterize the probability 
measures which are acceptance functions. This is done by 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 8: The only probability measures P that 
are acceptance functions are such that P( {roo}) > 112) for 
some ro0 and the probability measures such that 3ro, ro', 
P( { ro}) = P( { ro'}) = 1/2. 
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Proof: 
The fact that a probability measure such that 
P( { ro0}) > 112) for some roo is an acceptance 
function is an immediate consequence of Proposition 
6. It remains to see if they are the only ones. Let P 
be a probability measure such that 112 ;;:: PI ;;::.,, ;;:: 
Pn with P({roj}) =Pi· Note that n;;:: 3, except if pi= 
p2 = 1/2. Then, it is easy to see that P is an 
acceptance function in that latter case. Assume n ;;:: 3. 
Note that A is accepted if and only if P(A) > 112 > 
P(A). Let A = { roi, . .. , roi} where i is the smallest 
rank such that P(A) = P( { ro I, . . .  , roi}) > 112. Let 
B = { roj, . . .  , ron} where j is the greatest rank such 
that P(B) = P({roj, . . .  , ron})> 1/2. Note, j � i, i < n 
and 1 < j (since PI < 112). Thus P(A n B) = 
P( { roj, . . .  , roj}) ::;; 112; in other words A is accepted, 
B is accepted but not A n B. Thus P is not an 
acceptance function. • 
Probability measures which are acceptance functions such 
that P( { ro0}) > 1/2) possess a "usual value", that is, an 
element which, in frequentistic terms, occurs more often 
than all the other together. 
4. 4 EXAMPLE OF AN ACCEPTANCE 
FUNCTION WHICH IS NOT A BELIEF 
FUNCTION 
All the examples of acceptance functions which have been 
presented in this paper until now are belief functions. 
However acceptance functions which are not belief 
functions can be imagined. For instance, let A, B be non-
empty subsets of .Q, such that A � B, B � A, A n 
B ::1:- 0. Let g be an acceptance function defined with K = 
A n B, g(A n B) = k, g(A) = k + E = g(B), g(A u B) = 
k + 3E. Let C such that B n C = 0 but A n C :t:. 0, 
g(C) = k < k (since C � K), g(A n C) = k - 2E, g(A u 
C) = k + 2E. Then we have 
g(A u B)+ g(A n B)= 
k + 3E + k > g(A) + g(B) = k + E + k + E 
g(A u C) + g(A n C) = 
_ 
k + 2E + k - 2E < g(A) + g(C) = k + E + k. 
According to Proposition 3, g is an (incompletely defined) 
acceptance function, but it is not a belief function since it 
does not hold that 
Bel( A u C) + Bel(A n C);;:: Bel(A) + Bel(C) 
nor a plausibility function since 
Pl(A u B) + Pl(A n B) ::;; Pl(A) + Pl(B) 
does not hold. The above results are in agreement with the 
claims made by Cohen(1993) that acceptance is distinct 
from belief, since not only are there few belief functions 
and probability measures (the common representations of 
belief) that can act as acceptance functions but acceptance 
functions need not even be a subset of belief functions. 
5 CONDITIONING ACCEPTANCE 
FUNCTIONS 
Conditioning is the basic operation underlying revision for 
confidence measures. The natural way for defining the 
conditioning of the belief set {A, g(A) > g(A.)} where g is 
an acceptance function, by the subset (proposition) C is to 
consider the conditioned belief set of accepted beliefs {A I 
g(A n C) > g(A. n C)}, denoted by 8<t.C(g IC). 
Indeed, this view of conditioning agrees both with the 
view of conditional statements in nonmonotonic reasoning 
where "if C then A generally" is understood as a constraint 
expressing that A is strictly more plausible than not A 
when C is true (e.g., Giirdenfors and Makinson, 1994), and 
with the way conditioning is defined for uncertainty 
measures like probability measures (P(A I C) > 112 > 
P(A 1 C)¢::) P(A n C)> P(A n C)), or belief functions 
(Pl(A I C)> Pl(A I C)¢::) Pl(A n C) > Pl(A n C)), or 
possibility and necessity measures (N(A I C) > 0 = 
N(A I C) ¢::) I1(A n C) > I1( A n C) where I1(A I C) is 
defined as the greatest solution of I1(A n C) = 
min(I1(A I C),I1(C)) and N(A I C) = 1 - I1(A I C)); see 
(Dubois and Prade, 1995) for the representation of 
conditional statements in terms of possibility measures. 
Extending the notion of (weak) independence recently 
introduced for possibility measures (Dubois et al., 1994) 
to acceptance functions, i.e., transposing the possibilistic 
definition: 
A is independent from C iff N(A) > 0 and N(A I C) > 0 
into 
A is independent from C 
iff g(A) > g( A) and g(A I C) > g( A I C), 
we see that an element A of a belief set still belongs to a 
belief set conditioned by C, if A is independent from C, 
which is intuitively satisfying. 
This view of conditioning is clearly compatible with the 
"closure under entailment" property of a belief set. 
Namely, we have the following result: 
Proposition 9: If g is a confidence measure, if A is 
such that g(A n C)> g(A n C) and A� B, then g(B n 
C)> g(B n C). 
Proof: 
Let A be such that g(A n C) > g( A n C) and let B 
such that A � B, then g(B n C) ;;:: g(A n C) since 
B :=2 A and g(A n C);;:: g(B n C) since A :=2 B and g 
is a confidence measure. Consequently, g(B n C) > 
I g(B r. C) and B e �l.(g I C). • 
Unfortunately, this view of conditioning is not generally 
compatible with the notion of a belief set, for all 
acceptance functions, because the restriction of an 
acceptance function to a subset C (on which the 
conditioning is made) is not always an acceptance 
function. To see it, consider, for instance a probability 
measure P defined by the distribution PI > 1/2 > P2 :=:: . . .  :=:: 
Pn with P({roj}) = Pi and C = {ro2, . . .  , ronl· Then we 
have no guarantee that P2 I (1 -PI) is strictly greater than 
112, and it is possible that P(· I C) is no longer an 
acceptance function. 
The key problem here is that the "closure under 
conjunction" property is lost by conditioning, generally. 
Namely it is not true that if g is an acceptance function 
g(S 11 C)> g(S 11 C)} - -- � g(S t1 T t1 C)> g(S u T) t1 C) g(T t1 C)> g(T t1 C) (A) 
Let us define a context-tolerant acceptance function as an 
acceptance function g such that for all C with g(C) > 0, 
property (A) holds. The requirement that a conditioned 
belief set is still a belief set means that the restriction of 
an acceptance function to any non-impossible subset C of 
n is still an acceptance function). 
Figure 2 
This property can be rewritten letting A = S r. Cr. T, 
B = S r. C r. T, E = S r. T r. C, D = C r. S r. T (see 
Figure 2): 
g(A u E)> g(B u D)
} 
g(B u E) > g(A u D) => g(E) > g(A u B u D). 
Restricting g to A u B u E in the above condition (i.e., 
letting D = 0) leads to a necessary condition for an 
acceptance function to produce a conditioned belief set that 
is still a belief set, namely 
\;;/A, B, E, mutually exclusive, 
g(A u E)> g(B)
} 
g(B u E)> g(A) => g(E) > g(A u B). (B) 
It is easy to check that condition (B) implies condition 
(A). Indeed with the same notations as above, displayed on 
Figure 2, let us cut D into two disjoint subsets D' and D". 
Then 
g(S r. C)> g(S r. C) and g(T r. C)> g(T r. C) 
Numerical representations of acceptance 155 
also write 
g(A u E) > g(B u D) and g(B u E) > g(A u D). 
Hence g(E u Au D") > g(B u D') and g(E u BuD')> 
g(A u D"). Using condition (B), one concludes g(E) > 
g(A u B u D' u D"), that is g(S r. T r. C) > g((S u 
T) r. C). This establishes the equivalence between (A) and 
(B). Condition (B) has been independently discovered by 
Friedman and Halpern (1995), and characterizes context­
tolerant acceptance functions. 
The determination of the acceptance functions which 
satisfy the above condition (B), that is, such that their 
restriction to any subset is an acceptance function is an 
open problem. These acceptance functions at least clearly 
include possibility measures (since any possibility 
measure is an acceptance function and a conditioned 
possibility measure is still a possibility measure), but 
also pathological cases like acceptance functions on a 3-
element set (since any set function on a 1-element or on a 
2-element set is an acceptance function trivially). 
We already observed that if g is an acceptance function, its 
dual h defined by h(A) = 1 -g( A) is still an acceptance 
function, and that g(A) > g(A) is equivalent to h(A) > 
h(A). But the closure under conjunction conditions written 
in the conditioned case for g and for h restricted to C are no 
longer equivalent since 1 -g( A r. C) is not equal to 
h(A r. C) except if C = n. This gives birth to two 
different ways of conditioning. 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The study of acceptance functions is relevant for the 
purpose of relating in a systematic way the revision of 
belief sets in the propositional settings to the notion of 
conditioning for measures of uncertainty. Indeed, it is 
known that Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson 
postulates for revision are underlied by 1) the assumption 
that a set of accepted beliefs is deductively closed, 2) the 
existence of an epistemic entrenchment relation on this 
belief set, which is equivalent to a necessity measure. The 
revision of belief sets can be expressed in terms of 
computing conditional possibility since any revision 
operation underlies a possibility measure I1 such that A e 
�*c if and only if I1(A r. C)> I1(A r. C) where �*c 
is the belief set resulting from revising a belief set � by 
means of input C, and N(A) = 1 - I1(A) is the numerical 
necessity function that represents the epistemic 
entrenchment relation underlying the revision of � 
(Dubois and Prade, 1992). This necessity measure exists if 
and only if the revision function satisfies the AGM 
postulates of Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson. It 
sounds reasonable to keep the deductive closure 
assumption and no longer to assume an epistemic 
entrenchment relation, so as to make revision in the 
propositional sense compatible with more theories of 
uncertainty. 
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If g is a context-tolerant acceptance function then 
�C(g I C) is a belief set containing C, so that g imbeds 
two of AGM postulates already. The next question is to 
figure out how many postulates are embedded in the 
acceptance function approach. The answer to that question 
will point out precisely what are the uncertainty theories 
that are coherent with the revision of belief sets in a 
logical setting. 
In the acceptance function approach, it makes sense to 
distinguish between the cases where C n K "#. 0 and C n 
K 
= 0, where K is the kernel subset of the acceptance 
function. If C n K "#. 0, conditioning on C corresponds to 
the idea of an expansion in the sense of m.irdenfors ( 1988). 
Note that g(C n K) = k 2:: g(K) 2:: g(C n K) from 
Proposition 2; when g(C n K) > g(C n K), C n K will 
play the role of the kernel subset of the acceptance 
measure restricted to C. When C n K = 0 and g(C) > 0, 
the conditionning comes down to a genuine revision. 
Another path to follow (and investigated by Friedman and 
Halpern (1995)) is to relate acceptance to conditional 
knowledge bases in the sense of Kraus, Lehmann and 
Magidor (1990). Namely a conditional assertion A fv B 
(read B is a plausible conclusion of A) is taken for granted 
if and only if g(A n B)> g(A n B). It is obvious that the 
inclusion-monotonicity of g implies that the inference 
relation fv satisfies the Right Weakening property (B t;;;; B' 
and A fv B implies A fv B'), that A fv A whenever g(A) > 
0, '\/ A"#. 0. Moreover if g is a context-tolerant acceptance 
function then the right AND property (A fv B and A fv C 
implies A fv B n C) follows. Friedman and Halpern 
(1995) suggest that other KLM properties are satisfied as 
well when property (B) holds. These results indicate that 
the class of useful, non-pathological acceptance functions 
for the purpose of belief revision (or equivalently: 
plausible reasoning) might not extend far beyond 
possibility measures. 
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